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You Are Too Soft!: What Can Corporate
Social Responsibility Do For Climate
Change?
Issachar Rosen-Zvi*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the run-up to the global climate summit in Copenhagen
(COP-15), 1 environmentalists, scientists, and politicians
referred to it as a historical event. As COP-15 drew near,
climate change activists and United Nations (UN) officials had
high hopes that December 2009 would be a watershed moment
for creating a new carbon-restricted global economy for decades
to come. Furthermore, following the result of the 2008
American presidential elections, many in the international
community felt that the path was clear to finally include the
United States in the agreement that would replace the Kyoto
Protocol, 2 and that developing nations—among them China
and India—would also take on some binding and enforceable
restrictions on Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions. The
European Parliament even had lofty expectations that an
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1. The fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP-15) to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change was held in Copenhagen on December 7-18,
2009. UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE 2 (2009), available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/logistics/application/pdf/cop15_ifp_web.p
df.
2. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Kyoto Protocol, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
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emissions reduction of 80% compared to 1990 levels by 2050
would be agreed on, possibly with a mid-term goal by 2020. 3
None of this happened, of course. The Copenhagen Accord, 4
accepted by twenty-eight parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 5 is a
political instrument—rather than a legal one—and thus is nonbinding on the parties. Moreover, there was no agreement on
concrete goals for GHG emissions reduction and no concrete
financial commitments were made by developed countries to
help poorer ones. In fact, the Accord contains only vague
aspirational language asking nations to voluntarily reduce
their emissions. 6 The sixteenth Conference of Parties (COP-16),
held in Cancun in December 2010, justified the pessimistic
outlook that preceded it and achieved no progress on new postKyoto targets. 7
In light of this failure of international climate change
negotiations, it is incumbent upon governments, civil society
organizations, and conscious citizens that care about the future
of the planet to explore innovative methods to combat climate
change. One such method is harnessing new regulatory tools—
often called “new governance” or “regulatory capitalism”—in
the service of restricting GHG emissions. The question is,
however, whether these novel regulatory tools can provide a
(partial) solution to the world’s predicament. This study is an
3. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2050: THE FUTURE BEGINS TODAY –
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU’S FUTURE INTEGRATED POLICY ON CLIMATE
CHANGE
17,
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&language=EN
&reference=A6-2008-0495.
4. REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES ON ITS FIFTEENTH
SESSION HELD IN COPENHAGEN FROM 7 TO 19 DECEMBER 2009, PART TWO:
ACTION TAKEN BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES AT ITS FIFTEENTH
SESSION
4-9
(2010),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf.
5. See Lavanya Rajamani, The Making and Unmaking of the
Copenhagen Accord, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 824, 825 (2010); see also United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, adopted May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.
6. See Rajamani, supra note 5, at 831-35.
7. See Press Release, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), UN Climate Change Conference in Cancún Delivers
Balanced Package of Decisions, Restores Faith in Multilateral Process (Dec.
11,
2010),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/applicati
on/pdf/pr_20101211_cop16_closing.pdf.
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initial exploration into this question.
The remainder of this article proceeds in three parts: Part
II of this article discusses briefly the many facets of the notion
of regulation. It argues that the study of regulation, and
particularly that of climate change regulation, should go
beyond traditional national and transnational regulation. It
should look for innovative and hybrid forms of regulation that
blur the distinction between public and private and destabilize
the boundaries between mandatory and voluntary regulatory
methods. Part III explores one such soft regulatory
mechanism—corporate codes of conduct and Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) reports—and evaluates its effectiveness in
the realm of climate change. In Part III, I report and analyze
the findings of a large-scale empirical study I conducted with
regards to climate change reporting by corporations. The study
covers the codes of conduct and accompanying CSR reports of
thirty multinational corporations (MNCs) in three sectors—
petroleum, automobile, and apparel—and from different
regions around the globe for the years 2008 and 2009. 8 I take at
face value the hard numbers provided by corporations as to
their climate change performance, as well as the actual actions
they claim to have taken in order to reduce GHG emissions
(rather than the softer public relations statements). On this
basis, I assess whether such actions represent a real effort to
combat climate change. In light of these findings, the
concluding Part IV reflects on the main question posed by this
article—namely, whether, and under what circumstances,
codes of conduct and CSR reports can serve as a useful tool in
the global battle against climate change.
II. FROM REGULATION TO GOVERNANCE
The perceived crisis of the centrist state set in motion a
major shift, characterized as a transition from regulation to
governance. 9 This shift—informed and morally legitimized by
8. The CSR reports are generally published around April of the year
following the year discussed in the report. For example, the 2009 CSR reports
discuss the corporations’ performance in the year 2008, and the 2010 CSR
reports discuss the corporations’ performance in the year 2009.
9. See Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local
Governments in an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 509, 517-18 (2010).
Over the past few decades, the centrist state has been attacked from
the right, center, and left for its inability to efficiently manage
resources and provide services, its susceptibility to capture by rent-
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neo-liberal ideology 10 —is a response to the challenges of
globalization, which has undermined states’ sovereignty by
transforming them (both normatively and practically) into one
among many norm-setting agents. It is also a product of the
perceived failure of command-and-control regulation to cope
with the complex, heterogeneous, and rapidly changing
world. 11 While previous conceptualizations conceived of
regulation as the promulgation of binding norms done
exclusively by states, current understandings point to the many
regulatory institutions beyond the state—among them
international, transnational and sub-national entities; social
movements; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and
business organizations. 12 Further, there has been a
proliferation of new regulatory tools spanning from classic
“hard law” command-and-control regulations issued, monitored,
and enforced by states to “soft law” mechanisms promulgated,
administered, and implemented by non-state agents. 13 In some
cases the tools encompass hybrid “hard/soft” regulatory
mechanisms such as enforced self-regulation, 14 metaseeking elites, its lack of responsiveness to citizen preferences, its
turning into all-powerful bureaucratic apparatus which hinders its
democratic legitimacy, its want of creativity and flexibility, its
coercive legislation and regulation, its oppression towards various
minorities . . . and its infringement on the basic negative liberties.
Id.
10. See Ronen Shamir, Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards a New
Market-Embedded Morality, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 371, 371-78 (2008).
11. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise
of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 356-61
(2004).
12. See David Levi-Faur, Regulation and Regulatory Governance 3-9
(Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance Working Papers Series,
Working
Paper
No.
1,
2010),
available
at
http://levifaur.wiki.huji.ac.il/images/Reg.pdf.
13. See id., at 7–8 (distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” law). The
definition of “regulation” used in this article is quite broad and follows Colin
Scott who defines “regulation” as “any process or set of processes by which
norms are established, the behavior of those subject to the norms monitored or
fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms for holding the
behavior of regulated actors within acceptable limits of the regime . . . .” Colin
Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional
Design, PUB. L., Spring 2001, at 329, 331.
14. Enforced self-regulation takes place when the regulator forces the
regulated business to issue rules and standards tailored to its specific needs,
which are then approved by the regulator or sent back for revision if they are
found lacking. The enforcement of these rules and standards is also carried
out by the business that is required to establish a compliance administration
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regulation, 15 and co-regulation. 16
Two major transformations are associated with the
emerging order of new governance: (1) a shift from public to
private and (2) from mandatory to voluntary regulation. Each
of these transformations focuses on different aspects of the
regulatory process and particularly on two questions: (a) who
are the regulators? and (b) how is regulation carried out? This
article will briefly discuss each transformation separately, but
it is important to bear in mind that real-world forms of
regulation are inherently intertwined and the analytical
boundaries between them are far from clear. 17
A. FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE REGULATION
The shift from public to private regulation covers two
complimentary transformations: one focuses on how regulation
is carried out (whether through traditional regulatory tools,
such as prohibitions in the criminal law or through market
mechanisms), while the other centers on the identity of the
regulator. The more important transformation for this article’s
purposes is the latter, namely the emergence of new types of
private and quasi-private regulators. Business entities, global
financial institutions, NGOs, international NGOs, and social
movements have become major contributors, both directly and
indirectly, to the content and shape of national and
international regulation. 18 Among the new regulators,
corporations—and especially MNCs—play a key role. With
revenues exceeding the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many
and bear all its costs. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 106 (1992).
15. Meta-regulation enables the regulated actors to determine their own
rules and standards while the role of the regulator is limited to monitoring the
integrity of the work of the compliance administration established by the
regulated entities. See Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal
Accountability for Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 207, 21719 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007).
16. Co-regulation is a regulatory scheme in which the responsibility for
regulation is shared by the regulator and the regulated entities. See LeviFaur, supra note 12, at 11.
17. See, e.g., Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and QuasiPrivate Standard Setting, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 498, 499-500 (Dan Bodansky et al. eds., 2007); David
Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 265
(2008).
18. See Vogel, supra note 17, at 262.
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developing countries, MNCs operating in such countries are
able to exert enormous economic and political pressure on
governments to regulate in a manner that is favorable to them,
and thus become the de-facto regulators. 19 Yet corporations
shape the regulatory landscape in developed countries as well.
They do so by using their immense power to influence decision
makers through lobbying and campaign contributions, as well
as by directly shaping regulation through sophisticated
interpretations, evasions, and by “making rules” where none
exist. 20
While for many years corporations approached
environmental regulation as something that is imposed from
above, devoting efforts and spending money to resisting it, 21 in
the new governance era many corporations have changed their
attitude. They have begun to operate under the assumption
that there is a business case for CSR, which often means going
“beyond compliance.” 22 As a result, corporations became active
participators in a host of innovative regulatory practices,
through both public-private initiatives (such as co-regulation
and negotiated agreements) 23 and unilateral voluntary
practices (such as taking part in certification programs,
adopting codes of conducts, and publishing annual CSR
reports). 24
Corporations, however, are not the sole private regulators
that have emerged to prominence in recent years. They
compete (or cooperate) with civil society organizations (such as
NGOs), social movements, and local communities—which work
strategically to create new forms of consciousness, shape
market preferences, and more generally, implement their own
version of social and environmental responsibility. Civil society
organizations entered the field of CSR following their failure to
convince national and transnational regulators to issue “hard”
19. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 187-88
(2006).
20. See Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate
Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 411, 412 (2005).
21. See ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, FROM HERESY TO DOGMA: AN
INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM 3 (2001).
22. Neil Gunningham, Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance:
Shifting Architectures, 21 J. ENVTL. L. 179, 193 (2009).
23. See id. at 186.
24. See id.
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regulation protecting the environment, and in light of their
frustration about the many successful challenges to such
governmental regulation from trade-oriented transnational
bodies such as the WTO. 25 Without fully abandoning their
attempts to influence the more traditional regulatory
mechanisms, civil society organizations began to also employ
less formal—but often more effective—regulatory tools, which
came to be known as “civil regulation.” 26
Civil regulation positions civil society organizations in a
complex relationship vis-à-vis corporations, cooperating and
competing with them at the same time. On the one hand, they
use adversarial strategies to challenge the irresponsible
behavior of corporations; for instance, through the
sophisticated deployment of various forms of media they are
able to gather and disseminate information about such
behavior, organize high-profile “naming and shaming”
campaigns, and orchestrate consumer boycotts all around the
globe. 27 Some of these campaigns—such as those against
Shell 28 and Nike 29 —were so successful that brand-sensitive
corporations are willing to “voluntarily” adopt social and
environmental norms, not mandated by hard law, in order to
make sure they do not fall prey to the next campaign. 30 More
recently, even as such adversarial practices continue, civil
society organizations have begun to cooperate with
corporations, formally and informally, moving “from boycotts to
global partnerships.” 31 Such cooperation can take different
forms, the most prominent of which are the many certification
programs that have emerged in the recent decade in which
NGOs “set standards, require external monitoring, and certify
25. See Vogel, supra note 17, at 264-65.
26. See Gunningham, supra note 22, at 197.
27. See, e.g., id. at 196 (explaining how, disapproving of the oil company
Shell’s proposal to dismantle and dispose at sea an abandoned oil rig,
Greenpeace garnered public support against the plan that led to a Northern
European boycott of Shell gas stations and ultimately to Shell withdrawing its
proposal).
28. Id.
29. See generally Vogel, supra note 17, at 274 (noting that Nike has made
signifanct effort and investment in monitoring factory working conditions as
more labor codes have emerged).
30. See Gunningham, supra note 22, at 197.
31. Joseph Domask, From Boycotts to Global Partnership: NGOs, the
Private Sector, and the Struggle to Protect the World’s Forests, in
GLOBALIZATION AND NGOS: TRANSFORMING BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT, AND
SOCIETY 157, 157 (Jonathan P. Doh & Hildy Teegen eds., 2003).
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compliance.” 32
B. FROM MANDATORY TO VOLUNTARY REGULATION
Regulation is often thought of as norms that are legally
binding on the regulated entity. Under such formal
conceptualization, the shift from public to private regulation
entails a move from mandatory to voluntary standard-setting,
since private regulators do not possess the legal power to
promulgate and enforce binding rules on market actors. A less
formalistic understanding of regulation, however, involves no
such entailment. Although there is an apparent connection
between the two shifts, the portrayal of private standards as
inevitably voluntary and of public regulation as invariably
mandatory is grossly inaccurate. The failure of governments to
effectively regulate global markets led to the emergence of
norms set by private agents—such as international financial
institutions and institutional investors—which cannot be
conceived of as “voluntary,” notwithstanding the fact that they
are unenforceable by state agents, since corporations are not in
a position to refuse to abide by such norms.
An example of a private non-voluntary regulation is the
“Equator Principles,” which require corporations seeking
project finance to abide by specific standards that are dictated,
audited, and enforced by International Financial Institutions. 33
While this private regulatory practice is not legally binding on
the corporations, neither is it voluntary, owing to the
indispensability of finance for large-scale projects and the
monopolistic power that global banks possess over such
financing. Another example is institutional investors using

32. Tim Bartley, Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation 3 (Jerusalem
Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working Paper No. 8, 2010), available at
http://regulation.huji.ac.il/papers/jp8.pdf. Governments and industry bodies
also use certification programs as a “mode of regulation.” Id. In addition,
certification programs can become more “public” if a governmental agency
decides to adopt it as a perquisite for participation in a public program.
33. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Paper for Presentation, at
Tel Aviv University, Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators: The
Equator Principles 3-5 (June 2-4, 2010) (on file with the author); see generally
About the Equator Principles, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equatorprinciples.com/index.php/about-ep (last visited June 12, 2011) (explaining that
financial institutions adopting the Equator Principles commit to not providing
loans when the borrower is either unwilling or unable to comply with the
Equator Principles).
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their proxy power to demand that corporations abide by those
social and environmental standards dictated by the
institutional investors. 34 What is witnessed, therefore, is a
variety of different types of norms that defy easy categorization
as either mandatory or voluntary 35 —displaying various
degrees of corporate discretion in adopting and abiding by such
norms. 36
C. CLIMATE CHANGE GOVERNANCE
The transitions from public to private and from mandatory
to voluntary regulation are apparent in climate change
governance. Market-based mechanisms are widely used to
combat climate change by both state and non-state actors, the
most prominent of which are cap-and-trade programs. 37 The
European Union (EU) was the first to institute a mandatory
emissions trading program for carbon dioxide (CO2), called the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), 38 and
was followed by other mandatory GHG emissions trading
schemes, such as the Australian’s NSW Greenhouse Gas
Reduction Scheme (GGAS). 39 More interesting is the
development of evolving voluntary GHG emissions markets,
which includes all carbon offset trades not required by
mandatory regulation. 40
34. An example is the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS), one of the largest institutional investors in the United States,
using its proxy power to enforce upon corporations the implementation of its
Core Principles of Accountable Corporate Governance. CALPERS, CORE
PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4-6 (2007), available
at:
http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/downloads/uscorpgov-principles.pdf.
35. See Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and
Public Accountability, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY
122 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2005); Morrison and RohtArriaza, supra note 17, at 499-500.
36. See Koenig-Archibugi, supra note 35.
37. See Carol M. Rose, Liberty, Property, Environmentalism, 26 SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y 1, 2 (2009).
38. For an exhaustive description of the EU ETS, see John C. Dernbach &
Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction, 29 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1214 (2008).
39. GREENHOUSE
GAS
REDUCTION
SCHEME,
http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au (last visited Apr. 4, 2011).
40. For a good description of the voluntary carbon markets, see generally
KATHERINE HAMILTON ET AL., BUILDING BRIDGES: STATE OF THE VOLUNTARY
CARBON
MARKETS
2010
(2010),
available
at
http://www.foresttrends.org/documents/files/doc_2433.pdf. For an analysis of the legal aspects of
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Certification programs are another voluntary private
regulatory measure used to combat climate change, mostly in
the field of renewable energy. A renewable energy certificate
(REC) program, also called a green certificate system, is a
response to both governmental policies (the most common of
which is the renewable portfolio standard (RPS)), 41 and the
demand of consumers (both businesses and households) for
green electricity. These certificates can serve two purposes.
First, in the case of governmentally-set obligations, they can
act as an accounting mechanism, or even as a proof to
customers that a certain amount of renewable electricity has
been produced. 42 Second, they can help to facilitate the creation
of a market for green electricity and environmentally
responsible behavior that functions independently from the
market of electricity as a commodity. 43
Of voluntary private regulation, the “softest” and least
institutional are corporate codes of conduct, which are the focus
of this article. This article provides an in-depth analysis of the
codes of conduct and associated CSR reports that are published
by thirty MNCs from three different industrial sectors
(petroleum, automobile, and apparel) and from different
regions of the world (the United States, Europe, and Asia) for
the years 2008 and 2009. This article asks whether codes of
conduct can ever be useful for addressing climate change, and if
so, what are the necessary conditions for their effectiveness.
voluntary carbon markets, see Michelle Passero, The Voluntary Carbon
Market: Its Contributions and Potential Legal and Policy Issues, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND 517 (David
Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2009). It is important to note, however,
that doubts have been raised lately with regards to the effectiveness of
voluntary carbon markets due to the failure of the most prominent carbon
market, the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX). See, e.g., Ezra Levant,
Imaginary Exchange Goes Poof: The Green Scheme Known As The Chicago
Climate Exchange Will Stop Trading Hot Air at the End of The Year, TORONTO
SUN, Nov. 14, 2010, at O6.
41. A RPS requires that an energy supplier provides a set amount of
electricity from renewable sources as a share of supplier’s total sales. RYAN
WISER & GALEN BARBOSE, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A STATUS REPORT WITH DATA THROUGH 2007, at 2 (2008), available at
http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/lbnl-154e-revised.pdf.
42. See ED HOLT & LORI BIRD, EMERGING MARKETS FOR RENEWABLE
ENERGY CERTIFICATES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES, NATIONAL
RENEWABLE ENERGY LABORATORY TECHNICAL REPORT, at 15 (2005), available
at http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/resources/pdfs/37388.pdf.
43. Id. at 9-10.
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The corporations chosen for this research are among the largest
in the world in their respective sectors, and the sectors
themselves represent industries with varying degrees of
harmful effects on the environment. 44
III. CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND CLIMATE
CHANGE
A. WHAT ARE CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT?
Corporate codes of conduct first came to prominence
towards the end of the twentieth century. 45 Codes of conduct
enhance corporations’ social and environmental commitments
by articulating the norms and standards by which they profess
to be bound. 46 Although some state governments have
encouraged this kind of disclosure either directly or
indirectly, 47 corporate codes and CSR reports are a mostly
voluntary activity intended to give an account to external
stakeholders of the social and environmental effects of their
business. 48 The reasons for the emergence and persistence of
codes of conduct are both complex and contested. Corporations
adopt them for one or more of the following reasons: in order to
prevent governmental intervention in the form of mandatory
regulation (known in literature as the “shadow of hierarchy” 49 );
to limit political opposition to the growing globalization of
markets; as a response to pressures from consumer groups; and
as a means to protect their reputation. 50 Be that as it may,
most MNCs today, especially those based or operating in
developed countries, cannot afford to operate without codes of
44. For a list of the Corporations see infra Appendex I, Tables 1–3.
45. See Ans Kolk & Rob van Tulder, Setting New Global Rules? TNCs and
Codes of Conduct, 14 TRANSNAT’L CORP. 1, 4-7 (2005).
46. See id. at 3-4.
47. See generally KPMG INT’L, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF
CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY
REPORTING
4
(2008),
available
at
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docu
ments/International-corporate-responsibility-survey-2008.pdf
(“One of the
most significant findings of the 2008 survey is that corporate responsibility
reporting has gone mainstream - nearly 80 percent of the largest 250
companies worldwide issued reports, up from about 50 percent in 2005.”).
48. See Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 45, at 7.
49. See Adrienne Héritier & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Introduction: The Shadow of
Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance, 28 J. PUB. POL’Y 1, 1-2 (2008).
50. See Tim Bartley, Corporate Accountability and the Privatization of
Labor Standards: Struggles Over Codes of Conduct in the Apparel Industry, 14
RES. POL. SOC. 211, 212, 220-27 (2005).
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conduct. 51
Codes of conduct can take various shapes and forms—
widely varying in their scope, norms, and the monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms included in them. 52 They can be
adopted unilaterally by individual corporations or by a group of
firms in a particular industry. 53 Corporations can also
subscribe to existing model codes prescribed by international
organizations, NGOs, or trade unions. 54 They can be authored
independently or in cooperation with several stakeholders. In
terms of scope, codes can touch on some or all of a variety of
issues (among them corporate governance, prevention of
corruption, human rights, labor standards, and environmental
protection) and range from vague declarations of intent to
specific detailed commitments. 55 In terms of monitoring, they
can be audited internally (first-party audit), by accounting
firms, or by independent third-parties such as NGOs. 56 Despite
this variety, one crucial aspect of the codes is similar across the
board—they are adopted voluntarily by corporations and are
currently beyond the reach of the state’s legal apparatus. Thus,
they rely on civil society organizations that use the market for
their monitoring and enforcement. Such private agents require
reliable information in order to become potent regulators.
Without reliable and comparable information regarding the
corporations’ environmental practices, achievements, and
targets, the “market for virtue” 57 cannot function.
The codes and CSR reports are, I submit, a reliable source
of information as to some of the corporations’ climate change
practices and achievements. This is so because corporations are
legally prohibited from making misleading statements in their

51. See. e.g., Ans Kolk, Sustainability, Accountability and Corporate
Governance: Exploring Multinationals’ Reporting Practices, 17 BUS. STRATEGY
& ENV’T 1, 4-5 (2008) (noting that 161 of the Fortune Global 250 companies
publish sustainability reports, which indicates growing attention by
multinationals on corporate accountability of non-financial issues).
52. See Kolk & van Tulder, supra note 45, at 3-4.
53. See id. at 4.
54. See Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self Regulation in a
Global Economy 14-18 (Tech., Bus. & Soc’y Programme Paper No. 2, 2001),
available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/codes/10/.
55. See id. at 19-23.
56. See id. at 19-26.
57. DAVID VOGEL, MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005).
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publications (which include the codes and annual CSR reports)
and such actions are punishable under various trade
legislations around the developed world, including the United
States’ Federal Trade Commission Act (US FTC), 58 The
European Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 59 and the
Australian Trade Protection Act. 60 For instance, the US FTC
guidelines on environmental marketing states that “[a]n
environmental marketing claim should not be presented in a
manner that overstates the environmental attribute or benefit,
expressly or by implication.” 61 Thus, while it is unlikely that
outright false representations will be made in a corporations’
CSR documents, it is still in a corporation’s interest to depict
itself in the best light possible and show that their practices are
better than their competitors. Otherwise, why bother to
prepare and publish a code of conduct and CSR reports? I,
therefore, relied in my study on the “hard” numbers provided
by corporations with regard to their GHG emissions reduction,
which can be measured and verified, while ignoring the softer
public relations statements they make.

58. In Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243, 258-62 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed,
539 U.S. 654 (2003), the California Supreme Court held that factual
statements made by corporations about their operations—the type of
information that is found in corporate codes and CSR reports—are commercial
speech and as such are subject to regulation preventing consumer deception.
The case was settled before the Supreme Court reached a decision, but the
California Supreme Court’s ruling remains good law.
59. Directive 2005/29, art. 5, 2005 O.J (L 149) 22 (EC).
60. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (Austl.). For a discussion of the Act and
the various green guideline issued under it by the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission, see Brian Preston, Climate Change Litigation, 26
ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 169, 171-75 (2009).
61. FTC Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16
C.F.R. § 260.6(c) (1998). See also 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (1996)
[A]ny party making an express or implied claim that presents an
objective assertion about the environmental attribute of a product,
package or service must, at the time the claim is made, possess and
rely upon a reasonable basis substantiating the claim. A reasonable
basis consists of competent and reliable evidence. In the context of
environmental marketing claims, such substantiation will often
require competent and reliable scientific evidence, defined as tests,
analyses, research, studies or other evidence based on the expertise of
professionals in the relevant area, conducted and evaluated in an
objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures
generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable
results.
Id.

540

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 12:2

B. THE “DIVISION OF LABOR” BETWEEN CODES OF CONDUCT AND
CSR REPORTS
Before delving deeper into the analysis, an account of the
relationships between the codes of conduct and CSR reports is
called for. As expected, the environmentally-sensitive
industries studied in this research (i.e., petroleum and
automobile) report heavily on environmental issues in general,
and GHG emission reduction efforts in particular. This is true,
however, only for the corporations’ annual CSR reports. The
codes of conduct, on the other hand, are surprisingly dull and
use, almost invariably, generic and non-binding statements
regarding environmental protection. For example, the codes of
conduct of corporations in the petroleum sector include vague
statements such as: “[w]e continually look for ways to reduce
the environmental impact of our operations, products and
services,” 62 “[w]herever we operate, we will strive to minimize
any damage to the environment arising from our activities,” 63
and “Chevron’s policy is to maintain the safety and health of
people and the quality of the environment where we operate.” 64
Furthermore, in most cases the environmental protection
requirements do not even attain a separate section in the code,
but are relegated to a subsection under the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) section. Similarly, the
codes of corporations in the automobile industry contain mostly
vague statements regarding environmental protection and
contain no commitments to reduce GHG emissions.
Thus, in order to understand the actual climate change
practices, one has to look at the CSR reports published
annually by the corporations. These hefty documents breathe
life, so to speak, into the loose statements corporations make in
their codes of conduct, translating them into detailed
62. ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SHELL CODE OF CONDUCT 10 (2006), available
at
http://wwwstatic.shell.com/static/public/downloads/corporate_pkg/code_of_conduct_englis
h.pdf.
63. BP GROUP CO., OUR COMMITMENT TO INTEGRITY: BP CODE OF
CONDUCT
16
(2005),
available
at
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/do
wnloads/C/coc_en_full_document.pdf.
64. CHEVRON CORP., BUSINESS CONDUCT AND ETHICS CODE 14 (2010),
available
at
http://www.chevron.com/Documents/Pdf/ChevronBusinessConductEthicsCode.
pdf.
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achievements, commitments, and targets.
We can understand the seeming vacuity of codes of conduct
containing abstract and rather empty norms, as compared with
detailed CSR reports consisting of more concrete commitments,
as an evasive maneuver aimed at avoiding legal liability. As
described by Shamir 65 and Bartley, 66 NGOs and advocacy
groups have begun to attempt to hold corporations accountable
to commitments undertaken in their codes of conduct. These
attempts, though so far unsuccessful, raised concerns among
corporations and discouraged them from assuming upon
themselves commitments that could be later interpreted as
legally binding. The result is a “division of labor” between the
codes of conduct and CSR reports that reflects an attempt by
the corporations to minimize their exposure to the risk of being
held legally liable while at the same time continuing to benefit
from the advantages of CSR, including bypassing governmental
intervention and protecting the corporations’ reputation from
“naming and shaming” campaigns.
C. CLIMATE CHANGE REPORTING
The attitudes corporations manifest towards their
environmental responsibility vary from sector to sector. In
some sectors the environment is a major concern, while, in
others, much less so. This is reflected in CSR reports.
Environmental reporting is widespread in the petroleum and
automobile sectors, and less so in the apparel sector. 67 This is
due to the diverse levels of risk—both legal and extra-legal—
each sector is exposed to, as well as the different expectations
arising from their economic, regulatory, and social licenses to
operate. 68 Traditionally, NGOs, social movements, and
conscientious consumers targeted corporations in the apparel
sector for their labor practices and cared much less about their
65. Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims
Act: On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 635 (2004).
66. Bartley, supra note 50, at 228–32.
67. The opposite is true with regard to labor practices. See Guy Mundlak
& Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison of Corporate Codes in
the Fields of Labor and Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
(forthcoming 2011) (on file with author).
68. On the social license to operate, as distinguished from other types of
licenses to operate, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM, ROBERT A. KAGAN & DOROTHY
THORNTON, SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT
41–74 (2003).
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environmental behavior, while the opposite was true for
companies in the petroleum industry. 69
That said, negative corporate attitudes to climate change
are gradually becoming an exception to this pattern. Apparent
differences do still exist between sectors in both the
pervasiveness and the quality of reporting, but these are
narrowing. Climate change stands out as something no
corporation (at least those operating and/or marketing products
in developed countries) can afford to disregard. The high
visibility of climate change in both public discourse and the
media, and the enormous social and political attention it
receives, has resulted in the emergence of climate change as
“one of the most important and urgent corporate responsibility
issues.” 70 There is also a growing uniformity in climate change
reporting (mostly in form rather than in substance) as a result
of the continuous efforts undertaken to standardize reporting
by institutions such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 71
and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). 72 All the same,
climate change reporting still varies both within and between
industries, and it is therefore useful to divide the discussion
accordingly.
1. The Petroleum Sector
Until recently, many corporations in the petroleum sector
contested climate change being a serious problem. 73 This is no
longer the case. None of the corporations in the petroleum
sector surveyed in the study contests the fact that climate
change is a major global issue and that fossil fuel is a chief

69. See PHILLIP STALLEY, FOREIGN FIRMS, INVESTMENT, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 194
(2010) (advocating a sensitivity to sectoral differences when conducting
empirical studies).
70. KPMG INT’L, supra note 47, at 49.
71. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES
(2006)
available
at
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/ED9E9B36-AB54-4DE1-BFF25F735235CA44/0/G3_GuidelinesENU.pdf.
72. CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, http://www.cdproject.net (last visited
Apr. 3, 2011).
73. See Robert L. Glicksman, Anatomy of Industry Resistance to Climate
Change: A Familiar Litany, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICY 83, 83–106 (David Driesen ed., 2010).
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contributor to climate change. 74 To the contrary, nowadays not
only do corporations pledge to lower their carbon footprint, but
they also compete among themselves regarding which one is
doing more to combat climate change. 75 All the same, and
notwithstanding the standardization attempts described above
that brought about some uniformity in reporting, corporations
still have wide discretion as to which environmental data to
highlight and which to hide, as well as in their reporting
methodology (i.e., choosing a baseline year from which
reductions are measured, the share of holding that requires
reporting, reporting data of operated versus owned facilities,
and the like). As a result, oftentimes the data reported leads to
an “information overload” 76 and confusion, instead of clarifying

74. See, e.g., BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008, at 15 (2009)
REVIEW
2008],
available
at
[hereinafter
BP,
SUSTAINABILITY
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_
s_assets/e_s_assets_2008/downloads/bp_sustainability_review_2008.pdf;
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, at 12 (2009) [hereinafter
SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT],
available
at
SHELL,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/1307/original/COP.pdf?1
262614257. For a discussion of this transformation in attitude see Ans Kolk &
David Levy, Winds of Change: Corporate Strategy, Climate Change and Oil
Multinationals, 19 EUR. MGMT. J. 501 (2001).
75. Shell, for example, takes pride in its CSR report that “we were one of
the first energy companies to recognise the climate change threat and to call
for action. We understand we have a role to play in helping address this
challenge . . . .” SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, supra note 74, at 12. See also
BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2009 AT 14–15 (2010), available at
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_as
sets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainability_review_2009.pdf;
CHEVRON CORP., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009 3 (2010)
[hereinafter CHEVRON, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009], available
at
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corporateresponsibility/2009/documents/
OIL,
2009
CORPORATE
Chevron_CR_Report_2009.pdf;
TULLOW
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 25–27 (2010) [hereinafter TULLOW, 2009 CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/tullowcr09_cr_report_2009.pdf.
76. For a general discussion of the idea of “information overload,” see, for
example, Kenneth E. Himma, The Concept of Information Overload: A
Preliminary Step in Understanding the Nature of a Harmful InformationRelated Condition, 9 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 259 (2007) (unpacking the idea
that people have access to more information than is good for them); Oren
Perez, Complexity, Information Overload, and Online Deliberation, 5 I/S: J.L.
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 43 (2009) (arguing that information overload affects
online democratic practices); . But see David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz &
Louis L. Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986) (arguing that consumers
do not, in fact, find themselves with too much information).
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the achievements and commitments undertaken by the
corporations and facilitating a comparison between them. This
can make it very hard to assess the merit of a given
corporation’s claims.
To highlight this problem, some examples are in order. BP
reports in 2009 that in 2008 its total direct GHG emissions
were 61.4 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MteCO2e),
down 2.1 MteCO2e from 2007. 77 Yet, it is noted in the footnotes
that the data is reported only from operations under BP
management control and that direct GHG emissions “are the
physical emissions from operations on an equity-share basis.
TNK-BP direct emissions are not included.” 78 These
qualifications turn out to be quite significant, making the
general statement rather misleading. First, operations under
BP’s management control represent only a small portion of BP’s
actual holdings. Second, TNK-BP, which is excluded from the
report, was in 2008 Russia’s third largest oil company, halfowned and of enormous importance to BP, representing 24% of
its production and 19% of its total reserves. 79 Thus, omitting it
from the report is not trivial. Moreover, later in the report the
2.1 MteCO2e drop from 2007 is explained as following: “The
principal reason for the drop in emissions is the change in BP
Shipping’s treatment of time-chartered vessels to better align
with industry practice for emissions reporting.” 80 In other
words, an accounting trick enabled the drop in emissions, not
actual initiatives taken by BP. It is worthwhile to note that in
the 2009 report BP demonstrates better reporting practice by
candidly admitting the exclusion of direct GHG emissions
associated with their 50% equity in their Russian associate
TNK-BP from previous reports. 81 Furthermore, BP reports that

77. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008, supra note 74, at 6.
78. Id. at n.a, n.e.
79. BP GROUP CO., ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009, at 27, available

at
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branc
h/STAGING/common_assets/downloads/pdf/BP_Annual_Report_and_Accounts
_2009.pdf.
80. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008, supra note 74, at 11.
81. BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2009: ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT 37 (2010) [hereinafter BP, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2009],
available
at
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_
s_assets/e_s_assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/Environmental_management.pdf.
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in 2008 GHG emissions from the TNK-BP group of companies
amounted to 22 MteCO2e on a 100% operated basis, and adds
that “while we do not yet include our equity share of emissions
in our reported total we continue to work with TNK-BP on
emissions reporting.” 82
Another major energy company, Shell reports in 2009 a
reduction of its direct GHG emissions from 82 MteCO2e in 2007
to 75 MteCO2e in 2008. 83 Yet, in the footnotes that accompany
the report the company adds the following important
disqualification:
“Petroleum
Industry
Guidelines
for
Greenhouse Gas Estimate, December 2003 . . . indicate that
uncertainty in GHG measurements can be significant
depending on the methods used.” 84 Moreover, the report notes
that “environmental data are for our direct emissions. We
report this way because these are the data we can directly
manage and affect through operational improvements.” 85
Lastly, reading the report carefully reveals that about one third
of the reduction in emissions was not due to performance
improvement but a result of reduced production in Nigeria
since 2006 due to the security challenges Shell is facing there. 86
Tullow Oil reports that between 2008 and 2009 its total
emissions fell by 55%, undoubtedly a huge reduction. 87 Alas, a
deeper analysis of the report reveals that the reduction is due
largely to the sale of the group’s UK Bacton facilities. 88
Moreover, careful analysis of the report exposes that when
subtracting the reduction that resulted from the sale of the UK
Bacton facilities, Tullow Oil’s emissions in fact increased in
2009 due to a substantial growth in the corporation’s welldrilling exploration program. 89
One reporting practice that distinguishes between
environmental leaders and laggards is to determine to what
extent a corporation proclaims concrete, verifiable and
ambitious commitments with regard to future GHG emissions
reduction targets. Such targets can later serve to evaluate the

26.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT, supra note 74, at 36.
Id. at 36 n.A.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 20.
TULLOW, 2009 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 75, at

88. Id.
89. Id.
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success or failure of the corporation in hitting its declared
targets, rather than just bragging about past achievements. In
this regard regional variations between corporations are
apparent: while American, British and non-western
corporations generally fail to report any targets and
commitments (let alone ambitious ones), continental European
corporations do set targets, and in some cases very impressive
ones.
BP (Great Britain) is a prime example of a laggard
corporation as it was criticized in its 2008 report by its auditor
(Ernst & Young) for failing to disclose “future performance
targets in relation to GHG emissions reduction.” 90
Unfortunately, this critique did not register with BP, as in its
2009 Sustainability Review BP again fails to include any
targets. 91 Tullow Oil (Great Britain) does not even mention in
its 2008 report GHG emissions reduction as a goal in its “future
issues/targets” section. 92 In its 2009 report, Tullow Oil is more
candid about the influence of the changing nature of its
business on its ability to report GHG emissions and to
formulate meaningful emissions reduction targets. 93 Chevron
(United States) declares in its 2008 report, in the section
dedicated to future plans, that it plans to “[c]ontinue to reduce
flaring and venting in our operations where feasible.” 94 Later
on, Chevron reports that its total emissions for 2008 were 59.6
million metric tons (mmt), exceeding its goal of 62.5 mmt, and
declares a preliminary goal of 60.5 mmt for 2009, slightly
higher than 2008’s actual emissions. 95 In its 2009 report
Chevron declares a preliminary goal for 2010 set at 59 mmt,
which is slightly higher than 57.4 mmt, which was its actual
emissions level in 2009. 96 Lastly, Bharat Petroleum (India)
90. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW 2008, supra note 74, at 23.
91. BP, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING 2009, supra note 81, at 37.
92. TULLOW OIL, 2008 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 7
(2009), available at http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/csr_08.pdf.
93. TULLOW, 2009 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT, supra note 75, at
26.
94. CHEVRON CORP., 2008 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 7 (2009),
available
at
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corporateresponsibility/2008/documents/
Chevron_CR_Report_2008.pdf.
95. Id. at 14.
96. CHEVRON, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009, supra note 75,
at 8.

2011]

YOU ARE TOO SOFT!

547

declares a goal for 2010 set at a 0.7% reduction from current
GHG emissions levels. 97 Chevron’s and Bharat Petroleum’s
practice of announcing such unimpressive goals enable them to
declare any reduction, however small, in the following year a
success.
This is not to say, however, that Environmental leaders
also do not exist (mostly in Europe). For example, ENI (Italy)
commits in its 2009 Sustainability Report to achieving a 70%
reduction of its gas flaring emissions by 2012 compared to 2007
levels, adding that “thanks to this objective, the CO2eq
emissions index per ktoe [kilotonne of oil equivalent] produced
will be reduced by 40% by 2013.” 98 Total (France) pledges to
halve flaring at operated sites from 2005 levels by 2014, 99 and
projects that its combined initiatives will lead to a reduction of
their direct GHG emissions from operated activities in 2015 by
roughly 15% from 2008 levels. 100 And OMV (Austria) sets an
impressive target of reducing its direct GHG emissions from
Exploration and Production and Refining and Marketing by one
million tons, or at least 10%, by 2015, as the result of efficiency
improvements. 101 Interestingly, Gazprom (Russia) is also an
environmental leader in this respect, setting the target of GHG
emissions (including transport emissions) at 91 million tons by
2020, which amounts to a 32% reduction from 2009 levels. 102
This regional variation in climate change related practices
is by no means obvious. Most of the corporations included in
the study are MNCs that operate and market their products all
around the globe and the product itself (oil & gas) is not a
“consumer product.” Nonetheless, as apparent from the study,
the country of incorporation and the structure of shareholding
97. BHARAT PETROLEUM, RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT: CORPORATE
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT
2008–09,
at
53
(2010),
available
at
http://www.bharatpetroleum.com/pdf/BPCL_CSR_2008_09.zip.
98. ENI S.P.A., SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 83 (2010), available at
http://www.eni.com/attachments/sostenibilita/sustainability-report-09-eng.pdf.
99. Total cites the need to acquire the agreement of all of its partners to
invest in the capital-intensive projects required to achieve such a target to
explain the remoteness of the 2014 target year. TOTAL, ENVIRONMENT AND
SOCIETY
REPORT
2009,
at
13
(2010),
available
at
http://publications.total.com/2009rse/beevirtua/data/TLCO_1004403_RA_TOTAL_BV_GB_ACC_bd.pdf.
100. Id. at 12–13.
101. OMV, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, at 28 (2010), available at
http://www.omv.com/Sustainabilityreport/SR09.pdf.
102. OAO GAZPROM, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 2009, at 34 (2010), available
at www.gazprom.com/f/posts/05/285743/environmental-report-2009.pdf.
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correspond, to a large extent, to the level of environmental
responsibility demonstrated by a corporation.
2. The Automobile Sector
All the corporations studied in the automobile sector report
their GHG emissions, and unlike the corporations in the
petroleum industry, car manufacturers include in their reports
not only GHG emitted in the production process, but also (and
more extensively) emissions from their products—the vehicles.
In their 2008 reports, most car manufacturers report their
respective plans to decrease the carbon footprint of their
products, setting specific targets and due dates. Renault, for
example, pledges to achieve an average of 140g CO2 per km for
all vehicles sold in the EU by the end of 2008. 103 BMW commits
to achieving CO2 fleet emissions of below 140g CO2 per km for
all the group’s new vehicles in Europe by 2015. 104 Volvo 105
reported that in 2008 average emissions levels in its European
fleet decreased from 190g to 182g CO2 per km, 106 and
announced its target to reduce emission levels to between 90g
and 100g CO2 per km by the year 2020. 107 Toyota announced
that it proceeded with its Fourth Toyota Environmental Action
Plan—a five-year plan (2006-2010) designed to reduce CO2
emissions by 35%. 108 Volkswagen declared its intention to
103. RENAULT, 2008 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 130 (2008), available at
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesDocuments/Renault%20%202008%20Registration%20Document.pdf.
104. BMW GROUP, SUSTAINABLE VALUE REPORT 2008, at 25 (2009),
available
at
http://www.bmwgroup.com/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/verantwortung/publik
ationen/sustainable_value_report_2008/_pdf/SVR_2008_engl_Gesamtversion.p
df.
105. In the years covered by this study, Volvo Cars was fully owned by the
American automobile manufacturer Ford Motors. In 2010 Ford Motors sold
Volvo Cars to the Chinese corporation Geely Holding Group. See, e.g., David
Pierson, Ford sells Volvo to China’s Geely auto group for $1.8 billion, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/29/business/la-fiford-volvo29-2010mar29.
106. VOLVO CAR CORP., 2008/09 CORPORATE REPORT WITH SUSTAINABILITY
7 (2009) [hereinafter VOLVO, CORPORATE REPORT], available at
http://www.volvocars.com/de/top/about/environment_protection/Documents/Su
stainability_Report_08_09.pdf.
107. Id. at 15.
108. TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, at 22 (2009),
available
at
http://www.toyotainbusiness.com/Images/TMC_Sustainability_Report_2008_tc
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“reduce the CO2 emissions of our new-car fleet in Europe (EU
27) by 20 percent over 2006 levels by 2015.” 109 Lastly, Tata,
clearly an environmental laggard in the industry (probably
because its non-Indian market share is relatively small), does
not provide any concrete CO2 emissions reduction targets or
achievements, and only included general statements in its CSR
reports, vowing to reduce emissions from vehicles that are
being manufactured. 110
Apparent from this data are two facts: first, the level of
commitment made by the various corporations in the industry
is quite similar; and second, most corporations limit their
reduction targets regionally to cars sold in the EU only. This
turns out to be the key to understanding the reporting norms in
the automobile industry, as well as their divergence from those
prevalent in the petroleum industry. The almost universal
reporting of GHG reduction targets in the car industry are due
not to superior norms that evolved voluntarily in the industry,
but to a different regulatory environment. A new regulation
issued by European Parliament and the Council require car
manufacturers to cap the average CO2 emission levels for
vehicle fleets sold in the EU at 140g per km by 2012 and at 95g
by 2020, with monetary penalties imposed on non-compliers. 111
m634-838999.pdf. It is, however, difficult to evaluate Toyota’s targets, since
they use different metrics. Rather than using the common measuring method
in the car industry —reduction of CO2 emissions per kilometer driven, Toyota
measures reduction of emissions volumes per unit of sales from the 2001 level.
This makes it relatively impossible to compare Toyota to the other car
manufacturers in terms of targets set and achieved.
109. VOLKSWAGEN GROUP, DRIVING IDEAS: SUSTAINABILITY REPORT
2009/2010,
at
59
(2010),
available
at
http://www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcorp/info_center/en/publications/2009/0
9/sustainability_report0.-bin.acq/qualBinaryStorageItem.Single.File/VW_Sustainability_Report_2009.pdf.
110. TATA MOTORS LTD., GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE REPORT 2008–09,
at
45–46
(2009),
available
at
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/pdf/GRI-report-08-09.pdf;
TATA
MOTORS LTD., 65TH ANNUAL REPORT 2009–10, at 30–31 (2010), available at
www.tatamotors.com/know-us/pdf/CG-Report-2010.pdf.
111. Regulation (EC) No 443/2009 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 April 2009 Setting Emission Performance Standards for New
Passenger Cars as Part of the Community’s Integrated Approach to Reduce
CO2 Emissions from Light-Duty Vehicles, 2009 O.J. (L140) 5, Annex I,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0001:0015:EN:P
DF. Current regulation reduces the cap even further demanding an average of
120g per km by 2012. It is also worth noting that on April 1, 2010, the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and National Highway Traffic

550

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 12:2

When taking this regulation into account, it is apparent that
the norms correspond to the regulatory requirements with very
few attempts to go beyond compliance.
Interestingly, in their 2009 reports most car manufacturers
cease to report compliance with the EU regulation, and instead
discuss improving average fuel economy and energy
consumption more generally. Volvo, for instance, announces its
target for 2009–2012 to reduce energy consumption per
manufactured unit by additional 15%. 112 Toyota vows to
improve average fuel efficiency—in all regions—by 15%
compared to 2005 and reduce emissions per unit produced by
29% compared to 2001. 113 Renault pledges to reduce CO2
emissions from internal combustion vehicles to an average of
130g CO2 per km by 2012 for its entire fleet. 114 Ford’s stated
objectives are to “reduce CO2 emissions from our U.S. and
European new vehicles by 30 percent by 2020, relative to a
2006 model year baseline.” 115 BMW, although not publishing a
Safety Administration (NHTSA) announced a joint final rule establishing a
national program aimed at reducing GHG emissions for new cars and trucks
sold in the United States. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg.
25,234 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600). The
standards that make up the first phase of the National Program apply to
passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles,
covering model years 2012 through 2016. Id. at 25,328. They require these
vehicles to meet an estimated combined average emissions level of 250 g of
carbon dioxide per mile, equivalent to 35.5 miles per gallon (MPG) if the
automobile industry were to meet this carbon dioxide level solely through fuel
economy improvements. Id. Since the codes and reports reviewed in this study
are from 2008, this new regulation has not yet affected the reporting.
112. VOLVO GROUP, VOLVO GROUP’S SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, at 47
(2010)
available
at
http://www.volvogroup.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/VGHQ/Volvo%20Group/I
nvestors/Financial%20reports/Sustainable%20reports/sustainability_report_0
9_eng.pdf.
113. But see TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, at 18
(2010),
available
at
http://www.toyota.eu/SiteCollectionDocuments/Sustainability%20report%2020
09/2009_sustainability_report.pdf (noting Toyota’s commitment to meeting the
EU-JAMA target of 140g/km in all markets, illustrating the manner in which
the EU regulations have influenced performance in other geographic regions).
114. RENAULT, 2009 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 150 (2009), available at
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesDocuments/Renault%20%202009%20Registration%20Document.pdf.
115. FORD MOTOR CO., 2009/10 BLUEPRINT FOR SUSTAINABILITY: THE
FUTURE AT WORK 4 (2010), available at http://corporate.ford.com/doc/sr09blueprint-summary.pdf.
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new report for 2009, responded to a private inquiry stating as
follows: “we intend to reduce emissions and the use of resources
in our production facilities (Energy, GHG, VOC, Waste) by 30%
in the period between 2006 and 2012.” 116 And Hyundai
declared its plan to achieve 50% improvement in vehicle fuel
efficiency by 2020 compared to 2008 average. 117 This shift from
regional (EU) to universal improvement in average fuel
economy and energy consumption validates the claim that in a
globalized economy, regional environmental regulation of
consumer products can result in a global “race to the top”
phenomenon. This is so since
[f]irms producing for markets with a high degree of environmental
regulation and targeting high-end consumer markets have little
incentive to use different production standards in areas of limited
statehood [in which less stringent or no environmental regulation
exists] thereby polluting the environment. They tend to transport
their regulatory standards abroad. 118

A problem discovered in petroleum industry reporting, that
recurs in CSR reports in the automobile sector, is the absence
of uniform reporting methods. This leads to unreliable data and
makes it impossible to compare between corporations.
Corporations are thus free to choose their format and method of
presentation in a way that makes them look more
environmentally responsible than they actually are, and that
hinders the comparative assessment of the achievements and
targets of the various corporations in the sector. One such
ubiquitous manipulation among car manufacturers (and
probably among other manufacturers of environmentally
sensitive consumer products) is choosing a favorable baseline
year from which GHG emissions reduction is measured. 119
116. E-mail from Jochen Frey, Corporate and Governmental Affairs
Officer, BMW Group to Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Assistant Professor of Law, Tel
Aviv University (Dec. 13, 2010) (on file with the author).
117. HYUNDAI MOTOR CO., 2008 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 44 (2009),
available
at
http://worldwide.hyundai.com/Web/C_Sustainability_down/2008_report.pdf.
118. Tanja A. Borzel & Thomas Risse, Protecting the Environment – How
Much State Does it Take? 11–12 (Nov. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the author).
119. In addition to the examples provided above, there are some additional
examples of this phenomenon. Volvo projects halving its climate impact from
goods transport by 2020 compared to 2005. VOLVO, CORPORATE REPORT, supra
note 112, at 51. Honda undertakes to reduce its automobile and motorcycle
emissions as well as its production emission per automobile unit by 10%, and
its production emission per motorcycle unit by 20% compared to 2001. HONDA
MOTOR CORP., HONDA ENVIRONMENTAL ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 13 (2010),
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Since actual emissions reduction is a function of both the
percentage of reduction and the baseline year, the power to
choose a baseline year enables corporations (potentially) to
manipulate the data by choosing a favorable year. Thus, if a
manufacturer chooses the “right” year, the reduction
percentage may look very impressive, but in fact may turn out
to be an increase rather than a decrease from the previous
year’s actual emissions. It also makes it difficult, and in some
cases impossible, to compare the levels of reduction presented
by different corporations.
3. The Apparel Sector
Environmental reporting in the apparel sector is quite
lacking. The environment is not a major concern for
corporations in the industry for two reasons: (1) the main
inputs of the sector are not inherently toxic or otherwise
burdening on the environment; (2) and no less important, since
the apparel industry is labor-intensive and comprises of
intricate supply chains, NGOs and conscious consumers focus
heavily on the labor standards of corporations in the sector, and
to a much lesser extent on their environmental outputs. This is
reflected in both the codes and the CSR reports that, relative to
corporations in the two other sectors studied, devote only scant
attention to environmental norms. Yet, even in the apparel
sector, we can see the exceptional character of climate change
as an issue about which all corporations feel obliged to report.
In fact, a clear pattern of improvement can be detected even in
the two years surveyed in this study.
The codes of conduct of most corporations in the apparel
industry discuss the environment only briefly, usually as part
of the health and safety section, 120 while others, such as Liz

available
at
http://world.honda.com/environment/report/pdf/2008_report_E_full.pdf. Mazda
declares an objective of 43.5% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels. MAZDA
MOTOR CORP., MAZDA SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010, at 30 (2010), available at
www.mazda.com/csr/download/pdf/2010/2010_n_p01.pdf.
120. VF’s Code of Business Conduct instructs the company to maintain a
safe and healthy work environment and manage its business in ways that are
sensitive to the environment. Code of Business Conduct, VF CORP., 8 (Dec.
2006),
http://media.corporateir.net/media_files/irol/61/61559/CorpGov/Code_of_Conduct.pdf. Gap’s Code of
Vendor Conduct requires all factories to comply with all the applicable
environmental laws and regulations. And “where such requirements are less
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Claiborne, do not mention the environment at all. 121 A notable
exception is H&M, whose corporate code takes the environment
seriously, assuming concrete commitments and mandating that
its suppliers act environmentally responsibly. 122
The CSR reports divulge a wide variation among the
corporations in both the quantity and quality of environmental
reporting. As with the other sectors studied, here too the
variation reveals a clear regional pattern, especially between
corporations that market their products mainly in Europe
(leaders) and those that are more focused on the American
market (laggards).
In their 2008 reports Liz Claiborne, Quiksilver, and VF do
not bother to discuss their climate change policy, achievements,
or targets. Gap, Abercrombie & Fitch, and Levi Strauss include
an environmental section in their reports, but their contents
are frankly insipid, containing neither specified commitments
nor clear targets. With regard to climate change reporting, Levi
Strauss and Abercrombie & Fitch ignore the issue altogether,
while Gap announced the completion of the first phase of an
environmental footprint assessment across select owned and
operated locations and pledged to develop quantifiable
environmental goals based on that assessment by the end of
2010. 123 It also reported a reduction of GHG emissions by 20%
between 2003 and 2008. 124 No concrete targets for emissions
reduction are set by any of the mentioned corporations.
The 2009 CSR reports reveal real progress in climate
change reporting. While Liz Claiborne and Quiksilver still
ignore the issue altogether and Gap reiterates its obligation to
complete the first phase of an environmental footprint
stringent than Gap Inc.’s own, factories are strongly encouraged to meet the
standards outlined in Gap Inc.’s statement of environmental principles” Code
INC.,
5
(2007),
of
Vendor
Conduct,
GAP
http://www.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/documents/COVC_070909.pdf.
Quicksilver’s Supplier Workplace Code of Conduct manifests a similar
attitude. Supplier Workplace Code of Conduct, QUIKSILVER INC. (Feb. 18,
2008), http://www.quiksilverinc.com/code_of_conduct.pdf.
121. See
Standards
of
Engagement,
LIZ
CLAIBORNE
INC.,
http://lizclaiborneinc.com/web/guest/standardsofengagement (last visited June
11, 2011).
CODE
OF
CONDUCT
5,
available
at
122. See
H&M,
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/COMMON_CODEOFC
ONDUCT_ENGLISH_PDF_1124202692491_1150269822085.pdf.
123. See GAP INC., 2007/2008 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 78, available
at http://www2.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/Utility/report_builder.shtml.
124. See id. at 79.
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assessment, other corporations show an improvement from
previous year’s reports. Abercrombie & Fitch, for instance,
announces that it recently hired Clear Carbon Inc. to help them
better understand their carbon footprint and improve their
efforts to improve sustainability in their stores and home office
campus. Abercrombie & Fitch also claims to have developed a
baseline by which to measure future reduction initiatives and
to help it identify potential reduction opportunities. The
inventory collected, it concludes, will be instrumental in
preparing its GHG reduction goal as part of its commitment to
the Climate Leaders program. 125 Similarly, VF adds a Carbon
Footprint & Energy Efficiency section to its report and states
that its
long-term aspiration is to operate with optimum energy efficiency
while continuously working to minimize our carbon footprint globally.
In 2010 we will complete our first global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions inventory, and begin the process of identifying
opportunities for reduction. Using 2009 as our baseline, by mid-2011,
we expect to establish and communicate our long-term GHG
reduction targets. 126

Levi Strauss provides for the first time a real reduction
target in its Response to Carbon Disclosure Project 2010,
announcing that it is working to reduce its carbon emissions by
11% by the year 2011, compared to a 2007 baseline, and
specifies reduction targets for different regions in which it
operates. 127
The two European corporations studied, H&M and C&A,
go much further than other corporations in the sector in terms
of environmental reporting, thus positioning themselves as
environmental leaders. A substantial portion of their respective
sustainability reports are dedicated to environmental
protection, providing real commitments and specified targets in
a wide variety of environmental matters, including the use of
chemicals in the production process, water and sewage
125. See
Sustainability,
ABERCROMBIE
&
FITCH,
https://afcares.anfcorp.com/anf/intranet/site/afcares/sustainability (last visited
Apr. 5, 2011).
CORP.,
126. Sustainability
at
VF,
VF
http://www.vfcorporation.com/corporate-responsibility/sustainability-at-vf (last
visited Apr. 5, 2011).
127. See LEVI STRAUSS & CO., RESPONSE TO CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT
2010,
at
7
(Oct
28,
2010),
available
at
http://www.levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/librarydocument/2010/10/carbondisclosure-response-2010.pdf.

2011]

YOU ARE TOO SOFT!

555

treatment, and consumption of energy in the production
process, transportation, and the stores. Particular attention is
given by H&M and C&A to their carbon footprint. H&M’s
Sustainability Report 2008 states that in 2005 H&M set the
target of a 10% reduction in CO2 relative to sales within 5
years, compared to a 2004 baseline. 128 It also pledges to reduce
CO2 emissions intensity by 5% per year until 2012. 129 Another
specified commitment made in the report is to make sure that
by 2020 the energy per square meter of retail space would be
reduced by 20% and that 20% of all energy consumption will
come from renewable energy. 130 In its Sustainability Report
2009, H&M announces that not only did it meet its 2005 target
but substantially surpassed it, achieving a CO2 emissions
reduction relative to sales of 32%, compared to a 2004
baseline. 131 It goes on to set another target of cutting the
group’s CO2 emissions relative to sale by a minimum of 5% per
year compared to the previous year from 2010 through 2012. 132
C&A’s 2010 report vows to increase the use of renewable
energy to reach 80% of their floor space by the end of 2010,
saving more than 100,000 tons of CO2 emissions in relation to a
2007 baseline, which amounts to a 22% reduction. 133
It is impossible to deduce from the data collected in this
study what the reasons are for the environmental leadership
demonstrated by H&M and C&A. A plausible hypothesis is that
it has to do with the shareholders and the locus of operation of
these corporations. Both corporations are based in Europe
(H&M in Sweden and C&A in Germany), and the lion’s share of
their sales also take place in Europe (more that 90% for H&M
and 100% for C&A). 134 Since European NGOs and consumers
128. See H&M, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008, at 34-36, available at
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/CSR_REPORT2008_P
DF_1240240530209.pdf.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. See H&M, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009, at 42, available at
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/CSR_REPORT2009_S
US_REPORT_1272005348413.pdf.
132. Id.
133. See C&A, ACTING SUSTAINABLY: C&A REPORT 2010 at 132, available
at
http://www.c-and-a.com/uk/en/corporate/fileadmin/mediathek/ukuk/downloads/CSR_Report_2010_en.pdf.
134. H&M, ANNUAL REPORT 2009, pt. 1, at 52-54, available at
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileobjects/pdf/en/ANNUAL_REPORT_A
RCHIVE2009__ITEM_3_1269424409886.pdf; Bringing fashion to Europe,
C&A INT’L, http://www.c-and-a.com/uk/en/corporate/company/about-us/ca-
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pay much more attention to the environmental performance,
including climate change related practices, of private
businesses, corporations that market in Europe are required to
behave environmentally responsibly in order to not lose
business or become the target of naming and shaming
campaigns. Another possible explanation is the more favorable
attitude of continental European corporate managers to their
companies’ environmental responsibility. 135
The growing awareness of NGOs and consumer groups
around the globe to the carbon footprint of corporations can
also account for the clear pattern of improvement in climate
change reporting standards in the apparel industry as a whole.
Levi Strauss, for instance, candidly admits that “[c]onsumers,
media and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly
aware of climate change and the role business can play in
reducing its emissions. As a consumer facing company, LS&Co.
is at risk for negative publicity or nongovernmental
organization (NGO) campaigns regarding our climate change
impact.” 136
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
What can we conclude from these findings? Are companies
indeed increasingly becoming environmentally responsible and
responsive to societal concerns about climate change? Or does
the move to new governance merely represent better public
relations strategies, with codes of conduct and CSR reports
serving as a new form of window dressing? The answer to these
questions is complicated. It is clear that codes of conduct and
CSR reports are “too soft.” They are a rather weak regulatory
tool, and it would be wrong to advocate for the replacement of
more traditional state regulation with codes of conduct or other
voluntary soft law mechanisms. Having said that, it would be
also imprudent to dismiss such mechanisms off-hand as mere
“green-wash” and forsake this path completely.
The accumulated research has clearly shown that soft law
mechanisms can be manipulated by corporations, but it is as
evident that such mechanisms can also be used to bring about
change. The question is, therefore, not whether codes of conduct
international/ (last visited May 27, 2011).
135. See Gunningham et al., supra note 68, at 95-134.
136. LEVI STRAUSS & CO., supra note 127, at 5.
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are inherently effective or ineffective, but what are the
conditions under which can they be made effective. 137 The
following is a preliminary reflection on this question as can be
concluded from the findings of this study.
First, the “hard” regulatory environment, which serves as a
background for soft law’s operation, is of utmost importance.
Soft law cannot by itself provide an answer to the mammoth
problem of climate change. For all their novel features, the new
forms of regulation exist “in the shadow of the state.” 138 But, as
we have seen, the more stringent the hard regulation is, the
more effective the soft law mechanisms that complement it are.
Moreover, in some cases—particularly when consumer products
are involved—regional “hard” regulation can have a universal
impact and bring about an environmental improvement that
spills over to markets all around the globe. Luckily, national
regulators, local governments, NGOs and other public and
private regulators do not have to choose just one among the
many tools that are on the plate, but can devise and apply
many strategies to combat climate change using,
concomitantly, hard, soft and hybrid regulatory mechanisms.
139

Second, stakeholders’ market pressure can bring about real
change in corporate attitudes and practices. This study
confirms what many studies have shown before: that
corporations operating in stakeholder-oriented countries or
producing consumer products that are sold in stakeholderoriented countries are more likely to adopt a better attitude
towards environmental responsibility. 140 This is apparent in

137. See, e.g., Richard M. Locke & Monica Romis, The Promise and Perils of
Private Voluntary Regulation: Labor Standards and Work Organization in
Two Mexican Garment Factories, 17 REV. INT. POL. ECON. 45 (2010); Cesar A.
Rodriguez-Garavito, Global Governance and Labor Rights: Codes of Conduct
and Anti-Sweatshop Struggles in Global Apparel Factories in México and
Guatemala, 33 POL. & SOC’Y 203 (2005); Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley,
Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and
Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 31, 50 (2008).
138. David Levi Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12, 13 (2005).
139. For an illuminating discussion of the beneficial effects of “mixing”
hard and soft regulatory tools see Dorit Keret, Don’t Judge a Book by its
Cover: Use of an Analytic Framework and Empirical Data in Analyzing
Environmental Policy Tools (Unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
140. See, e.g., Ans Kolk & Paolo Perego, Determinants of the Adoption of
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the realm of climate change reporting as well. European
corporations in all sectors performed better than non-European
corporations and both performed better than corporations in
developing countries. The more corporations that realize their
markets are socially embedded and that customers care about
these issues, the more they will become environmentally
responsible.
Lastly, and most importantly, this study has shown the
critical role of transparency and standardization for the success
of CSR. As this article demonstrates, most corporations feel
obliged to report their GHG emissions and initiatives to combat
climate change since they realize that they have to answer to
their stakeholders. This development opens new opportunities
for NGOs and state regulators. The challenge we face today is
how to make the environmental reporting, currently quite
deficient, into a better and more effective regulatory tool. The
answer is more uniformity and substantive standardization in
reporting in order to make manipulation of the data much
harder and facilitate the comparative analysis of the
performance of different corporations. Finally, NGOs and State
regulators should leverage corporate attitudes in order to
improve uniformity and standardization, which would be much
easier to do (and much harder to resist) from a political
standpoint than prescribing substantive norms for GHG
reductions. Such improvements are needed for transparency,
which is, in turn, the basis for the further ratcheting up of
environmental standards. 141

Sustainability Assurance Statements: An International Investigation, 19 BUS.
STRATEGY & ENV’T 182 (2010).
141. See Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke, & Archon Fung, Ratcheting Labor
Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace
(John F. Kennedy School of Government Faculty Research Working Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
00-010,
2000),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=262178; see also Stalley,
supra note 69, at 204 (advocating the making of ISO certification more
transparent).
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APPENDIX I – CORPORATIONS SURVEYED IN THE
RESEARCH

Name of Corporation
Abercromby & Fitch
BMW
Bharat Petroleum
BP
C&A
Chevron
Chrysler Group
ENI
Ford
Gap
Gazprom
H&M
Honda
Hyundai
Levi Strauss & co.
Liz Claiborne
Lukoil
Mazda
ÖMV
Quiksilver
Renault
Shell
Surgutneftegas
Tata Motors
Total
Toyota
Tullow Oil
VF
Volkswagen
Volvo

Sector
Apparel
Automobile
Petrol
Petrol
Apparel
Petrol
Automobile
Petrol
Automobile
Apparel
Petrol
Apparel
Automobile
Automobile
Apparel
Apparel
Petrol
Automobile
Petrol
Apparel
Automobile
Petrol
Petrol
Automobile
Petrol
Automobile
Petrol
Apparel
Automobile
Automobile

Country
USA
Germany
India
UK
Germany
USA
USA
Italy
USA
USA
Russia
Sweden
Japan
South Korea
USA
USA
Russia
Japan
Austria
USA
France
Netherland
Russia
India
France
Japan
UK
USA
Germany
Sweden (USA)
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APPENDIX II – SOURCES AND REFERENCES
Table 1: Apparel Sector
Document
URL
Abercrombie & ABERCROMBIE
&
FITCH,
Fitch
http://www.abercrombie.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
Sustainability
Sustainability, ABERCROMBIE & FITCH,
https://afcares.anfcorp.com/anf/intranet/site
/afcares/sustainability (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
C&A
C&A, http://www.c-and-a.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
Acting
C&A, ACTING SUSTAINABLY: C&A REPORT
available
at
http://www.c-andSustainably 2010 2010,
a.com/uk/en/corporate/fileadmin/mediathek/
uk-uk/downloads/CSR_Report_2010_en.pdf.
H&M
H&M, http://www.hm.com (last visited Apr.
15, 2011).
Code of Conduct
H & M, CODE OF CONDUCT, available at
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileob
jects/pdf/en/COMMON_CODEOFCONDUC
T_ENGLISH_PDF_1124202692491_115026
9822085.pdf.
Sustainability
H&M, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2008,
Report 2008
available
at
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileob
jects/pdf/en/CSR_REPORT2008_PDF_1240
240530209.pdf.
Sustainability
H&M, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009,
Report 2009
available
at
http://www.hm.com/filearea/corporate/fileob
jects/pdf/en/CSR_REPORT2009_SUS_REP
ORT_1272005348413.pdf.
Gap Inc.
GAP, http://www.gap.com (last visited Apr.
15, 2011).
Code of Vendor GAP INC., CODE OF VENDOR CONDUCT,
Conduct
available
at
http://www.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/
documents/COVC_070909.pdf.
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2007/2008 Social
Responsibility
Report
Goals
and
Progress
Environment
Levi Straus &
Co.
Worldwide Code
of
Business
Conduct
Global Sourcing
and
Operating
Guidelines
2008
Report

Annual

Climate Change
Impact
Carbon
Disclosure

Liz Claiborne
Code of Conduct
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2007/2008 Social Responsibility Report,
INC.,
GAP
http://www2.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/cs
r/Utility/report_builder.shtml (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
Goals
and
Progress,
GAP
INC.,
http://www.gapinc.com/GapIncSubSites/csr/
Goals/Environment/En_Goals.shtml
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
LEVI’S, http://www.levi.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., WORLDWIDE CODE OF
BUSINESS CONDUCT (2010), available at
http://levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/libr
arydocument/2010/5/wwcoc-english_0.pdf.
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., GLOBAL SOURCING
AND OPERATING GUIDELINES, available at
http://levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/libr
arydocument/2010/4/Sourcing_and_Operati
ng_Guidelines.pdf.
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., PROFITS. PRINCIPLES.
2008 ANNUAL REPORT, available at
http://levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/libr
arydocument/2010/4/AR_2008.pdf.
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., CLIMATE CHANGE,
available
at
http://levistrauss.com/sites/default/files/libr
arydocument/2010/9/climate-change.pdf.
LEVI STRAUSS & CO., RESPONSE TO CARBON
DISCLOSURE PROJECT 2010 (Oct. 28, 2010),
available
at
http://www.levistrauss.com/sites/default/file
s/librarydocument/2010/10/carbondisclosure-response-2010.pdf.
LIZ
CLAIBORNE,
http://www.lizclaiborneinc.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
LIZ CLAIBORNE INC., CODE OF CONDUCT,
available
at
http://lizclaiborneinc.com/web/guest/search/j
ournal_content/56/10123/10668.
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Philanthropic
Programs
Quiksilver
Supplier
Workplace Code
Of Conduct
Annual
2008

Report

VF
Code of Business
Conduct

Global
Compliance
Principles

Global
Compliance
Report 2005

Sustainability at
VF
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Philanthropic Programs, LIZ CLAIBORNE
INC.,
http://lizclaiborneinc.com/web/guest/overvie
wofprograms (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
QUIKSILVER,
INC.,
http://www.quiksilverinc.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
QUIKSILVER INC., SUPPLIER WORKPLACE
CODE OF CONDUCT (Feb. 18, 2008),
available
at
http://www.quiksilverinc.com/code_of_condu
ct.pdf.
QUIKSILVER INC., QUIKSILVER ANNUAL
REPORT
2008,
available
at
http://www.quiksilverinc.com/AnnualReport
s/Quiksilver_Annual_Report_2008.pdf.
VF CORPORATION, http://www.vfc.com (last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
VF CORP., CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT
(Dec.
2006),
available
at
http://media.corporateir.net/media_files/irol/61/61559/CorpGov/Co
de_of_Conduct.pdf.
VF
CORP.,
GLOBAL
COMPLIANCE
PRINCIPLES,
available
at
http://www.vfc.com/VF/corporation/resource
s/images/Content-Pages/CorporateResponsibility/VFC-Global-CompliancePrinciples.pdf.
VF CORP., GLOBAL COMPLIANCE REPORT
2005,
available
at
http://www.vfc.com/VF/corporation/resource
s/images/Content-Pages/CorporateResponsibility/VFC_Glo_Compli_Report.pdf
.
Sustainability
at
VF,
VF
CORP.,
http://www.vfcorporation.com/corporateresponsibility/sustainability-at-vf
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
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Table 2: Oil & Gas Sector
Bharat
BHARAT
PETROLEUM,
Petroleum
http://www.bharatpetroleum.com
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
Corporate
BHARAT
PETROLEUM,
RESPONSIBLE
DEVELOPMENT: CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY
Sustainability
REPORT 2008–09 (2010), available at
Report 2008/9
http://www.bharatpetroleum.com/pdf/BPCL
_CSR_2008_09.zip.
BP
BP, http://www.bp.com (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
Annual
Report BP GROUP CO., ANNUAL REPORT AND
2009,
available
at
and
Accounts ACCOUNTS
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globa
2009
lbp/globalbp_uk_english/set_branch/STAGI
NG/common_assets/downloads/pdf/BP_Ann
ual_Report_and_Accounts_2009.pdf
Code of Conduct
BP GROUP CO., OUR COMMITMENT TO
INTEGRITY: BP CODE OF CONDUCT (2005),
available
at
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/gl
obalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/
C/coc_en_full_document.pdf.
Sustainability
BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW
2008
(2009),
available
at
Review 2008
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/gl
obalbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_assets/e
_s_assets_2008/downloads/bp_sustainabilit
y_review_2008.pdf.
Sustainability
BP GROUP CO., SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW
2009
(2010),
available
at
Review 2009
http://www.bp.com/assets/bp_internet/globa
lbp/STAGING/global_assets/e_s_assets/e_s_
assets_2009/downloads_pdfs/bp_sustainabil
ity_review_2009.pdf.
TNK-BP
- Programs
and
Initiatives,
TNK-BP,
Evaluation
of http://www.tnk-bp.com/hse/programs/gasesGHG Emissions
emissions (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
Chevron
CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com (last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
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Report 2008
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Report 2009
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Sustainability
Report 2009
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Environmental
Report 2009
Lukoil
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Report 2007/08
ÖMV
Sustainability
Report 2009
Shell
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CHEVRON CORP., BUSINESS CONDUCT AND
ETHICS
CODE
(2010),
available
at
http://www.chevron.com/Documents/Pdf/Ch
evronBusinessConductEthicsCode.pdf.
CHEVRON
CORP.,
2008
CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2009), available at
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corpor
ateresponsibility/2008/documents/Chevron_
CR_Report_2008.pdf.
CHEVRON
CORP.,
CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2009 (2010),
available
at
http://www.chevron.com/globalissues/corpor
ateresponsibility/2009/documents/Chevron_
CR_Report_2009.pdf;
ENI, http://www.eni.com (last visited Apr.
15, 2011).

ENI, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 (2010),
available
at
http://www.eni.com/attachments/sostenibilit
a/sustainability-report-09-eng.pdf.
GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com
visited Apr. 15, 2011).

(last

GAZPROM, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 2009
(2010),
available
at
www.gazprom.com/f/posts/05/285743/envir
onmental-report-2009.pdf.

LUKOIL, http://www.lukoil.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
LUKOIL,
2007-2008
SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT: RUSSIAN FEDERATION, available at
http://www.lukoil.com/materials/doc/reports
/Social/lukoil_eng_07-08.pdf.
ÖMV, http://www.omv.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2001).
ÖMV, SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 (2010),
available
at
http://www.omv.com/Sustainabilityreport/S
R09.pdf.
SHELL, http://www.shell.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
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ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SHELL CODE OF
CONDUCT (2006), available at http://wwwstatic.shell.com/static/public/downloads/cor
porate_pkg/code_of_conduct_english.pdf.
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT
2008
(2009),
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/att
achments/1307/original/COP.pdf?12626142
57.
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL, SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT
2009,
available
at
http://sustainabilityreport.shell.com/2009/
servicepages/downloads/files/all_shell_sr09.
pdf.
SURGUTNEFTEGAS,
http://www.surgutneftegas.ru (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
SURGUTNEFTEGAS,
ENVIRONMENTAL
REPORT
2009,
available
at
http://www.surgutneftegas.ru/uploaded/ekol
ogia2009titul.pdf.
TOTAL, http://www.total.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).

TOTAL, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY
REPORT 2009 (2010), available at
http://publications.total.com/2009rse/beevirtua/data/TLCO_1004403_RA_TO
TAL_BV_GB_ACC_bd.pdf.

TULLOW OIL, http://www.tullowoil.com (last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
TULLOW OIL, CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT
(2009),
available
at
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/Code_of_
Business_Conduct_2009_Rev_2.pdf.
TULLOW
OIL,
DELIVERING
GROWTH
RESPONSIBLY
(2008),
available
at
http://smartpdf.blacksunplc.com/tullow2008
csr/Tullow_2008_CSR.pdf.
TULLOW OIL, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY POLICY (2009), available at
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/EHS_poli
cy.pdf.
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TULLOW OIL, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
POLICY
(2009),
available
at
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/CSR_poli
cy.pdf.
TULLOW
OIL,
2009
CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2010), available at
http://www.tullowoil.com/files/pdf/tullowcr0
9_cr_report_2009.pdf.

Table 3: Automobile Sector
BMW
BMW GROUP, http://www.bmwgroup.com
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
Compliance.
BMW
GROUP,
COMPLIANCE.
ACTING
RESPONSIBLY AND LAWFULLY (2008),
Acting
at
Responsibly and available
http://www.bmwgroup.com/bmwgroup_prod
Lawfully
/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/unternehmen/
unternehmensprofil/compliance/BMWGrou
p_Legal_Compliance_Code.pdf.
Environmental
GROUP,
ENVIRONMENTAL
BMW
Protection. BMW PROTECTION. BMW GROUP ENVIRONMENTAL
GUIDELINES
(2003),
available
at
Group
http://www.bmwgroup.com/bmwgroup_prod
Environmental
/e/0_0_www_bmwgroup_com/verantwortung
Guidelines.
/publikationen/downloads/_pdf/BMWGroup
_Environmental_Guidelines.pdf.
Sustainable
BMW GROUP, SUSTAINABLE VALUE REPORT
Value
Report 2008
(2009),
available
at
2008
http://www.bmwgroup.com/e/0_0_www_bm
wgroup_com/verantwortung/publikationen/s
ustainable_value_report_2008/_pdf/SVR_20
08_engl_Gesamtversion.pdf.
Ford
FORD MOTOR CO., http://corporate.ford.com
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
Sustainability
FORD MOTOR CO., 2009/10 BLUEPRINT FOR
SUSTAINABILITY: THE FUTURE AT WORK
(2010), http://corporate.ford.com/doc/sr09blueprint-summary.pdf.
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Environmental
Annual
Report
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Report
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Report 2010
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Operational
Energy
Use
and
CO2
Emissions,
FORD
MOTOR
CO.,
http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustain
ability-report-2009-10/environment-dataenergy (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
Progress and Goals, FORD MOTOR CO.,
http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustain
ability-report-2009-10/environmentprogress (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
HONDA
WORLDWIDE,
http://world.honda.com (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
HONDA
MOTOR
CORP.,
HONDA
ENVIRONMENTAL ANNUAL REPORT 2009,
available
at
http://world.honda.com/environment/report/
pdf/2009_report_E_full.pdf.
HONDA
MOTOR
CORP.,
HONDA
ENVIRONMENTAL ANNUAL REPORT 2010
(2010),
available
at
http://world.honda.com/environment/report/
download/2010/2010_report_E_full.pdf.
HYUNDAI,
http://worldwide.hyundai.com
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011).

HYUNDAI
MOTOR
CO.,
2008
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT (2009), available
at
http://worldwide.hyundai.com/Web/C_Sust
ainability_down/2008_report.pdf.

MAZDA, http://www.mazda.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).

MAZDA
MOTOR
CORP.,
MAZDA
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2010 (2010),
available
at
http://www.mazda.com/csr/download/pdf/2
010/2010_n_p01.pdf.

RENAULT, http://www.renault.com (last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
RENAULT, CODE OF GOOD CONDUCT,
available
at
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20%20Code%20of%20ethics%20-%20en.pdf.
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RENAULT, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, available
at
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20%202008%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
RENAULT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, available
at
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20%202009%20Interactive%20Annual%20Rep
ort.pdf.
RENAULT, 2008 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20-%202008%20Regis
tration%20Document.pdf.

RENAULT, 2009 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT
(2009),
available
at
http://www.renault.com/en/Lists/ArchivesD
ocuments/Renault%20-%202009%20Regis
tration%20Document.pdf.

TATA MOTORS, http://www.tatamotors.com
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
Tata Code of Conduct, TATA MOTORS LTD.
(Oct.
1,
2008),
http://www.tata.com/aboutus/articles/inside.
aspx?artid=NyGNnLHkaAc=.
TATA MOTORS LTD., GLOBAL REPORTING
INITIATIVE
REPORT
2008–09
(2009),
available
at
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/p
df/GRI-report-08-09.pdf
Social Responsibility Annual Report 2008MOTORS
LTD.,
2009,
TATA
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/C
SR-09/content.php (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
Social Responsibility Annual Report 2009 –
10,
TATA
MOTORS
LTD.,
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/C
SR-10/content.php (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
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TATA MOTORS LTD., GLOBAL COMPACT —
COMMUNICATION ON PROGRESS, available at
http://www.tatamotors.com/sustainability/p
df/COP-2008-2009.pdf.
TOYOTA,
http://www.toyota.co.jp
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., CODE OF CONDUCT
(2006),
available
at
http://www2.toyota.co.jp/en/vision/code_of_c
onduct/code_of_conduct.pdf.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUPPLIER CSR
GUIDELINES
(2009),
available
at
http://www.toyotaglobal.com/sustainability/stakeholders/pdf/s
upplier_csr_en.pdf.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., GREEN PURCHASING
GUIDELINES 2006 (2006), available at
http://www.toyota.co.jp/en/environment/visi
on/green/pdf/all.pdf.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT
2008
(2009),
available
at
http://www.toyotainbusiness.com/Images/T
MC_Sustainability_Report_2008_tcm634838999.pdf.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT
2009
(2010),
available
at
http://www.toyota.eu/SiteCollectionDocume
nts/Sustainability%20report%202009/2009_
sustainability_report.pdf.
TOYOTA MOTOR CORP., SUSTAINABILITY
REPORT
2010
(2011),
available
at
http://www.toyotaglobal.com/sustainability/sustainability_rep
ort/pdf_file_download/10/pdf/sustainability_
report10.pdf
VOLVO,
http://www.volvocars.com
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2011).
VOLVO CAR CORP., VOLVO CARS GRI REPORT
2008 (2009), available at http://www.volvo
cars.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/TopNavi
gation/About/Corporate/VolvoSustainability
/Volvo_Cars_GRI_Report_2008.pdf.
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VOLVO CAR CORP., VOLVO CARS GRI REPORT
2008
(2009),
available
at
http://www.volvocars.com/SiteCollectionDoc
uments/TopNavigation/About/Corporate/Vol
voSustainability/Volvo_Cars_GRI_Report_2
008.pdf.
VOLVO CAR CORP., 2008/09 CORPORATE
REPORT WITH SUSTAINABILITY (2009),
available
at
http://www.volvocars.com/de/top/about/envi
ronment_protection/Documents/Sustainabil
ity_Report_08_09.pdf.
VOLVO
GROUP,
VOLVO
GROUP’S
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009 (2010),
available
at
http://www.volvogroup.com/SiteCollectionD
ocuments/VGHQ/Volvo%20Group/Investors/
Financial%20reports/Sustainable%20report
s/sustainability_report_09_eng.pdf.
Ambitious Targets for Our Own Logistics,
VOLVO
GROUP,
http://www.volvogroup.com/group/global/engb/responsibility/envdev/env_work/producti
on/logistics/Pages/logistics.aspx (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).
VOLKSWAGEN,
http://www.volkswagenag.com (last visited
Apr. 15, 2011).

VOLKSWAGEN GROUP, DRIVING IDEAS.
SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 2009/2010 (2010),
available
at
http://www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/vwcor
p/info_center/en/publications/2009/09/sustai
nability_report0.-bin.acq/qualBinaryStorageItem.Single.File/VW_Sustain
ability_Report_2009.pdf.

